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SERIOUS UNTOWARD INCIDENTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH IN ACUTE 
INPATIENT PSYCHIATRY: THE TOMPKINS ACUTE WARD STUDY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Background: Serious untoward incidents, or sentinel events (suicide, homicide, suicide 
attempt, serious assault and elopement of high risk patients) occur from time to time in 
association with acute psychiatric inpatient wards.  
Aim: To discover the impact of serious untoward incidents on inpatient wards. 
Method: Doctors, nurses and occupational therapists at three hospitals were 
interviewed about these events and their impact on their wards.  
Findings: Staff reported feelings of shock, depression, demoralisation, upset, loss, and 
grief, followed by ruminations, guilt and anxiety. Levels of containment increased, as 
did the focus on risk assessment. Processing of the emotional impact was hindered by 
the pace of ward life, a lack of external support, and management investigations. Patient 
responses were largely ignored. A few staff responded negatively, hindering service 
improvements.  
Conclusions: Much more attention needs to be given to the needs of the patient group 
following incidents. Substantial planning, organisation and investment are required to 
properly prepare for such events and manage their outcome. Without this planning and 
action, acute inpatient work has the capacity to be damaging to staff. 
Keywords: Self-Injurious Behaviour, Homicide, Suicide, Violence, Absconding.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The risk of serious untoward incidents in acute inpatient psychiatry is small, but 
appreciable and ever present. The inpatient suicide rate in England is 0.14%, or one for 
every 714 admissions (Powell et al 2000). The number of suicide attempts exceeds the 
number of completed suicides by a factor of ten (i.e., 2700 attempts versus 240 suicides 
in The Netherlands; Brunnenberg & Bijl, 1998). The figure for homicides by inpatients 
is 9 per year in England and Wales (Department of Health 2001). Violent incidents are, 
however, fairly common on acute inpatient wards. Nijman et al (2004) report a mean 
rate across Europe of 9.3 per patient year, although a large majority of these involve 
verbal abuse and property damage, rather than actual physical assault. Absconding 
(elopement) by patients is also common, although negative outcomes are not. Bowers et 
al (1999, 2003) report an absconding rate of 6.1 per patient year, although many of these 
are not officially reported as such, and only 3.6% result in any kind of adverse outcome. 
 
In the UK, a serious untoward incident (SUI) in psychiatric services is generally 
considered to be any incident where medical treatment was required or death occurred, 
or where moderate to high financial loss, or loss of reputation might occur. The 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA, 2006) defines a 'patient safety incident' even 
more broadly as any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to 
harm for one or more patients receiving National Health Service funded care. An SUI is 
similar to a 'sentinel' event in the USA, as defined by the Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO, 2005), which is "an unexpected 
occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk 
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thereof." Both JCAHO and the NPSA mandate Root Cause Analysis for the 
investigation of such incidents. Root Cause Analysis is a systematic approach to the 
identification of underlying reasons behind errors and mistakes which has been widely 
used in industrial and other settings (Rooney and Vanden Heuvel, 2004). In a Root 
Cause Analysis, detailed data is collected about the sequence of events, which is then 
analysed using a variety of diagrammatic tools such as “cause-and-effect”, 
“interrelationship” and “current reality tree” (Doggett 2004). This causal analysis is 
directed towards identifying the reasons why the identified causes existed, proceeding 
step by step until the “root causes” (those that if changed will prevent future incidents 
throughout the organisation) are recognized. 
 
Little (1992) describes three stages in staff responses to suicide; disbelief and 
fear of further suicides, turmoil and exhaustion, followed by growth or prolonged 
disability. These contrast with the stages described by Bartels (1987) of shock, recoil 
(guilt, shame, anger, depression, self-doubt), and a search for meaning; a pattern 
confirmed by Cotton et al (1983). There is a significant literature on staff responses to 
attempted suicide (e.g. Main 1957, Maltsberger et al 1974) most of which stems from 
the psychoanalytic tradition and suggests that such patients are rejected and avoided by 
staff, possibly increasing suicide risk (Morgan and Priest 1991). Only two papers on the 
effects of homicide on staff could be located. One (Turns and Gruenberg 1973) found 
no impact on the use of containment (increases in transfers to closed wards or 
tranquilliser use, decrease in home leaves and discharges). A similar result was reported 
more recently by Bowers (in press), although an increase in staff leaving the service was 
found. There is a plentiful literature on the impact of less severe patient violence on 
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staff, although most of this relates specifically to staff who have been victims of attacks, 
and not to vicarious violence witnessed occurring to other staff or to patients. Ryan and 
Poster (1989) report that staff suffer from post traumatic stress disorder, and Baxter et al 
(1992) reporting that half of nurses consider it can take several months to recover 
emotionally. In interviews of nurses about absconding by patients, Clark et al (1999) 
found emotional reactions primarily of anxiety and fear of blame. 
 
The data we report here were collected as part of the Tompkins Acute Ward 
Study, a multi-method longitudinal investigation of links between adverse incidents and 
staff factors. Previous papers from this study have described the nature and purpose of 
acute wards (Bowers et al 2005), the role of the Occupational Therapist (Simpson et al 
2005), and the relationship of adverse incidents to patient flow (Bowers et al, in press 
a), and aggression related training (Bowers et al 2006). In this paper we examine the 
impact of serious untoward incidents on inpatient wards, and how those events affect 
the subsequent practice of acute psychiatry. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
DESIGN 
 
Cross-sectional interview survey of multidisciplinary staff working on acute 
psychiatric wards 
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SAMPLE 
 
Multidisciplinary staff (n = 56) in one NHS Trust, composed of Ward Managers 
(n = 16 [0]), F Grade mental health nurses (n = 17 [0]), Occupational Therapists (n = 14, 
[3]) and Consultant Psychiatrists (n = 9, [15]). Numbers in the square brackets are of 
those who declined to participate, or did not respond to an invitation to do so. Staff from 
14 acute psychiatric wards and three psychiatric intensive care units were included in 
the study, and all Ward Managers, Occupational Therapists and Consultant Psychiatrists 
were approached and asked to participate. Where there was more than one F Grade 
nurse on a ward, the person first contacted was asked to participate. The interviews were 
conducted from October to December 2003. The 17 wards were on three hospital sites, 
and provided a comprehensive psychiatric service to a population of nearly half a 
million. The mean rate of admissions (2002-2004) was 3.15 per ward per week; 57% 
were male, 48% under 35 years of age and 54% had a psychotic disorder. Most included 
wards had 18 beds, and were staffed by a combination of qualified psychiatric nurses 
(approximately 75%) and unqualified health care assistants.  
 
INSTRUMENT 
 
The Operational Philosophy and Policy Interview (OPPI) was developed for this 
study. This semi-structured interview, used in its baseline form, covers the general care 
philosophy of the subject, their concept of the purpose of acute inpatient psychiatry, 
interdisciplinary relationships, team strengths and weaknesses, ward structure, the 
recent history of events and changes on the ward and plans for changes in practice in the 
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coming six months. The interview framework was initially created by the principal 
investigator (LB) and derived from current knowledge of the field plus his previous 
research work in the area. It was then reviewed twice by the research team and 
suggested changes incorporated. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
This study received ethical approval from the Local Research Ethics Committee, 
and conforms to the provisions of the Declaration of Helsinki in 1995 (as revised in 
Edinburgh 2000). Prospective interviewees were contacted by phone and initially asked 
if they would participate. Subject to their agreement, a mutually convenient 
appointment was made. At that time a researcher explained the study in more detail, 
gave the subject an information sheet, and asked for their signed consent. Interviews 
were then conducted, mostly on the wards or in adjacent offices. All interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed except one (where notes were taken). Following 
transcription, the accuracy of the transcripts was checked against the initial recordings, 
and corrections made. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Interview transcripts were imported into qualitative data analysis software (QSR 
N6) and basic factual coding completed (e.g. ward, profession, etc.). All interviews 
were then read by three researchers, who met to collate ideas on analytic categories and 
priorities. A strategy for coding was then agreed. As a preliminary step, interviews were 
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coded to the broad topic areas of the structured interview questions. For the findings 
reported in this paper, interviewees’ responses about serious untoward incidents were 
read and re-read. As an interim step, a table of incidents by ward was created, so that 
differing accounts of the same incident could be readily identified. Key themes were 
identified and coded for each professional group interviewed. A serious untoward 
incident was considered to be whatever interviewees mentioned in response to questions 
about whether there had ever been a serious incident on the ward. This did not 
necessarily match the local definition of SUI for all respondents, although all SUIs as 
defined by Trust policy were mentioned in response to this question. Once an incident 
had been identified by the subject, they were asked follow up questions on the impact 
and consequences.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
All interviewees spoke about serious untoward incidents when asked. Between 
them they identified 39 incidents: 11 completed suicides, 5 attempted suicides, 2 
homicides, 3 natural deaths, 7 serious absconds (elopements), 4 assaults, 1 alleged rape, 
1 attempted rape, 3 serious threats, 1 accidental injury and 1 self harm incident. In 
addition to these incidents affecting patients, they spoke about 2 incidents of alleged 
staff misconduct, and one staff completed suicide. By no means had all of the incidents 
taken place on the ward – many had not. Neither was the perpetrator always an inpatient 
at the time – if they were known by the ward staff there would still be a certain amount 
of impact. And those effects endured for long periods of time. Although many of the 
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incidents we were told about had occurred during the year preceding the interviews, a 
substantial number were far more distant in time, with some being 2 or 3 years ago, and 
one having taken place ten years previously. Nevertheless, it was clear that these 
incidents, although distant in time, were still having an influence on practice in the 
present.  
 
IMPACT ON MORALE 
 
The emotional effect of the less severe of these incidents was largely restricted 
to the wards where they occurred. However the more severe incidents, particularly those 
involving deaths, had effects across the hospital where they occurred. On several 
occasions interviewees told us about events on other wards that had had an effect on 
theirs. 
 
Interviewees spoke of the depression and demoralisation of the ward team that 
could occur following an SUI, with one Consultant Psychiatrist saying "the atmosphere 
on the ward was very sombre for a while", and another saying "people were rather 
numbed and troubled by it and so the staff lost their zest". Several of the nurses spoke 
about these events having a large negative impact on morale. However often linked with 
these statements were comments about the driving force of the ward routine and the 
needs of other patients, new patients, and how that necessity to focus on current 
problems forced the staff to get on with things, preventing them from dealing with their 
feelings about the SUI. The ward "has to carry on producing the goods irrespective" in 
the words of one ward manager. 
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People are always talking about it for a little while afterwards if something like that's 
happened.  Because the ward is so hectic it's hard to, people might sometimes feel a bit 
guilty about not moving on, because, I remember when this guy died on the ward, 
somebody needed a bed and the bed area hadn't been cleared and I think it was a bit of 
a respectful thing to maybe leave it just for a day or so.  But they're under so much 
pressure that they had to get it cleared. (Occupational Therapist) 
 
After SUIs in which patients died, people also spoke about their sense of upset, 
loss and grief. These feelings were particularly acute when the patient had been known 
for some time, or the team had a real commitment to them, with one ward manager 
saying "she was so well known to us, she was almost like a member of the family, it 
definitely hit me so hard that", and another: 
 
Well we had an SUI, when a patient killed themselves and that had a hell of an impact 
on the nurses. The patient had been with us for quite a while, and it's like all of us 
including the doctors, obviously everybody domestic, everybody, and it was first 
admission, you just had a soft spot for him, and everybody was really concerned about 
him, and everybody was basically involved in his care, and every week he got seen, 
every ward round he got reviewed and so on.  Then he started looking a bit brighter, a 
bit more hope for the future, he went home for [leave] . The day he killed himself, he was 
talking to me, it was the first time I'd seen him looking so bright, and then about less 
than ten hours later we heard he'd just died, and that was just like, the impact it had on 
everybody on the ward, we couldn't understand why it happened. (Ward Manager) 
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Others also commented that SUIs came as a shock, were unexpected, and more 
devastating because of that. This sense of shock went across the board for all types of 
events – staff were definitely shocked by deaths, however they were also shocked by 
attempted suicides, violent assaults, and by allegations of misconduct by a member of 
the team. 
 
SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING 
 
Hard on the heels of feelings of shock, grief and depression came ruminations 
about whether anything could have been done to prevent the incident from occurring. 
Such ruminations were frequently mixed with tentative feelings of guilt and dismay, 
with the events rehearsed and alternatives explored and rejected. At the time of the 
interviews some of these circular thoughts had become a well-worn track.  
 
We had a serious self-harm on the ward, somebody who had a history of self-harm, … 
were in a one to one position but it didn't work out because some people resent being 
under one to one observation. And we tried to use options,can we give her more space, 
or do we do it whether she likes it or not? But those were the difficult situation and I 
think, on reflection, sometimes we have to take complete control of people's care, 
sometimes to prevent an incident, but on the other hand, you always have to balance it, 
what is definitely the best interest for the patient as well.  And the thing is it is difficult 
to get that balance right. I, we only don't get it right sometimes. (Ward Manager) 
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Others spoke of wishing they could have done more, wondering whether they 
could have acted differently, or of reassuring themselves that there was nothing else 
they could have done. Some spoke of feeling guilty just because someone had died, 
whilst also fully knowing there was nothing they could have done.  Sometimes mixed in 
with these feelings were a sense of general stress, heightened anxiety, and specific fears. 
In relation to violent incidents and threats, the anxiety was about the future behaviour of 
the assaultive or threatening patient, with an Occupational Therapist commenting "It 
made me feel quite unsafe on the ward for a little while after, a little bit nervous". For 
absconds, there was anxiety about what the patient might do while away from the ward, 
"for an hour and a half when I was phoned on the Saturday, you know your career 
flashes in front of your eyes, and you think if he was to go and kill himself, that would 
be it, and you feel quite exposed and vulnerable." In relation to other incidents, 
primarily those involving deaths, the anxiety was about the reaction of managers and 
the public, "people were scared, people were shocked I think people were afraid that 
they were then going to be criticised or blamed". Other spoke about the feeling that their 
practice would be inspected, and that their professional registration might be under 
threat. 
 
It devastated the team because we had a dreadful management structure that  
it was, the blame culture was overwhelming.  I just had to go the mortuary  
to identify him, the very same day senior managers came, trying to  
blame somebody, all different staff. When something happens, it doesn't  
matter who's fault it is, you're under scrutiny, as an individual, as a practitioner, as a 
human being. (Ward Manager) 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 14 
 
 
Several spoke about a continuing anxiety and worry that such an incident might 
happen again at any time, coupled with a feeling that even their best efforts were 
probably not enough to prevent all eventualities. One interviewee noted that these 
feelings of anxiety were not confined to the ward staff themselves, but seized hold of 
the entire management hierarchy. 
 
I think there was, I think there was a lot of fear really, a lot of fear and I don't think that 
was just fear on the ward, I think there was fear going up the management levels as well 
so I don't think it just affected you know unqualified staff, D grades [and]  E grades 
[qualified nurses] , myself.  I think it, it had an effect on the operational manager, it had 
an effect on the matron, it had an effect on the lead nurse and so I think it was felt all 
the way, all the way through really. (Occupational Therapist) 
 
MANAGERIAL RESPONSES 
 
Interviewees mentioned a variety of managerial responses, and these fell into 
three groups: support, investigation and change.  
 
(a) Support 
 
Support was, of course, received very positively by staff, who were emotionally 
traumatised by some SUIs. The presence of managers on the ward, visiting even if only 
for short periods to ask how staff were was highly valued. However this seemed more 
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likely to be mentioned if the incident was of a lesser severity, or if it was immediately 
apparent to everyone concerned that nothing could have been done to prevent its 
occurrence. A couple of interviewees mentioned that professionals from 'outside' had 
been drafted in to facilitate discussions, or that counselling for staff had been made 
available; both of these were experienced as supportive and helpful.  
 
(b) Investigation 
 
Investigation of the SUI was experienced in different ways. For very serious 
incidents, managers came to the ward and took away all notes and records, and while 
one interviewee saw this as normal procedure, another saw it as part of a process of 
looking for someone to blame. Discussion and debriefing about the incident occurred at 
different levels. The ward manager might bring the staff together to talk, or managers 
might come to the ward to discuss the event with the staff. These meetings could be 
helpful, as they got things into the open with the team, and enabled those who were not 
on duty at the time of the incident to talk more easily with those who were. However at 
these meetings difficult questions might be asked about why certain actions were or 
were not carried out, hence they could be uncomfortable. 
 
I highlighted to people that, you know, 10 p.m. why would you give somebody a razor 
who is not going out to work in the morning, who is, who lives here, you know, 24 
hours, why would you give him a razor?  Oh I thought, you know, theory said, I said 
forget about theory, forget about, use your head.  (Ward Manager) 
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(c) Change 
 
Changes introduced in the wake of an SUI could take place straight away, or be 
introduced later as a response to issues thrown up by more thorough investigation (e.g. 
the removal of potential ligature points). Senior managers sometimes had to take more 
drastic action, such as suspending staff, occasionally ultimately terminating their 
employment. In due course a number of other changes were introduced to prevent the 
recurrence of the same incidents, these could include new policies, documentation, or 
physical changes to the ward environment. Interviewees mentioned new policies for 
special observation (with associated documentation), and changes to window and fence 
design, and to door security practices. New policies were also variously received by 
staff, with some seeing them as a device to further blame frontline staff when things 
went wrong, whilst others saw them, if followed, as protective of staff because they 
described best practice. 
 
As these changes indicate, SUIs led to increases in the use of various means of 
containing acutely mentally disturbed patients, and a general tightening of all 
procedures in this area. This tended to happen quite separately from, and additionally to, 
the managerial responses to the incident. Interviewees mentioned a greater emphasis on 
risk assessment, a greater reluctance to give patients leave from the ward, more rigorous 
documentation and form-filling, more regular checks on patients throughout the day and 
night, and the nailing up of windows providing ventilation (as well as egress). Doctors 
noticed that nurses required them to take more decisions, with those decisions being 
recorded and signed for. Nurses noticed that doctors were more prone to put patients on 
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continuous special observation. All in all there was a heightened sense of vigilance and 
alertness.  
 
PATIENT RESPONSES 
 
There were few comments about the reactions of other patients to these 
incidents. Some interviewees spoke of breaking the news of a death to other patients, 
with an Occupational Therapist reporting that there had been discussion about how to 
do so, another mentioning that patients had received counselling, and a Consultant 
Psychiatrist who was struck by the lack of reaction.  
 
We had lots of different meetings over the course of the day, which was really quite 
surreal, but one of them involved all the other patients because obviously we had to tell 
them and I was struck by how disinterested they superficially appeared. Very few of 
them seemed to take any of that information on board at all and I did talk  
about it with a few people subsequently, but people seemed to move on very quickly. 
(Consultant Psychiatrist) 
 
Other comments about patient reactions were concern about copycat incidents, 
and an acknowledgement that patients experienced heightened fear and anxiety 
following an assault. Although the scope of the interview questions asked were broad, 
for example "did that have an impact on the ward", this was largely interpreted by 
interviewees to mean exclusively the staff. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Acute feelings were aroused in staff as a consequence of SUIs.  Factors involved 
in the impact of SUIs appeared to be the severity and outcome of the incident, the 
strength of the relationship with the patient involved, the availability (or lack of) 
support and aftercare directly after the incident, the perception of whether the SUI could 
have been prevented in some way, and managerial responses.  
 
Although some of the resulting feelings were akin to those following loss and 
bereavement, there was no obvious sequence or process to those feelings. However the 
nature of the feelings reported is similar to previous studies (Cotton 1983; Bartels 1987; 
Little 1992). Staff struggled to keep things in proportion regarding investigations when 
they were in a state of emotional shock and turmoil. Managers conducting the 
investigation were also not immune to anxiety and dysphoria, perhaps in part arising out 
of their complicity in organisational policy and practice, and in part out of the fact that 
they themselves will be judged by those above them, and increasingly by the media 
(Paterson and Stark 2001). Clearly managers, who are responsible for investigating the 
incident, and who may need support themselves, cannot at the same time give those 
staff support in a genuine or meaningful way. The inexorable pace of ward life 
compelled staff to put their feelings to one side and get on with caring for others. In 
combination with a lack of external support in many cases, this hindered staff in talking 
with each other about the event and its consequences. 
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Frontline staff in these interviews spoke of the value of outside support where it 
was made available. This could be commissioned by employers, but not provided by 
them, or provided by different managers or specialist personnel within the organisation 
(separate from those responsible for post-incident investigation). This would not then 
prejudice the outcome of any investigation. It could be that such help aids staff in 
recovering, but it could also be that it makes post-incident adjustment more difficult or 
worse. In the latter case, the pace of ward life and the lack of external support may 
actually be protective, and oblige staff to make a quick recovery. However, virtually no 
research has been done on the impact of SUIs on staff over the longer term. The staff in 
this study clearly expressed their need for (and valuing of) external support, and these 
evaluations should be taken seriously and support provided.  
 
This study shows that SUIs had a continuing emotional and practice influence 
up to 10 years after they had occurred. Heightened alertness, attentiveness to risk 
assessment, more rigorously pursued policies, greater use of containment methods like 
special observation and higher environmental security may or may not be good. They 
are certainly better than a laissez-faire, lax, overconfident, complacent staff culture 
which is imbued with the idea that incidents cannot really be prevented. However the 
use of containment methods (special observation, security measures, sedating 
medication, seclusion etc.) can become excessive to the degree that they have a negative 
and harmful impact on patients (Dodds and Bowles 2001), or risk assessment can be 
emphasised to the point that it dominates practice and draws attention away from 
treatment (Hardwick 2003). Only when the SUI is as a result of containment itself does 
this work the other way (e.g. Goldney et al 1986; Blofeld et al 2003). Finding the right 
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balance between risk and containment is complicated by the emotions left over from 
professionals' previous experiences of SUIs, and a lack of evidence on what constitutes 
good risk assessment or an effective level of containment. Thus judgments both vary 
widely and tend to be emotionally charged, perhaps the least helpful of all possible 
resulting scenarios. 
 
It may help staff cope with the emotional repercussions if they prepare 
themselves for this reality, and consider in advance the possibility that SUIs may occur 
(Bartels 1987). The benefits of this would be more than a mindset that is more prepared 
to cope with the aftermath of an incident. There is a temptation to ignore the chance of 
such things happening (coupled with a hope that they will happen on someone else's 
shift or ward), which engenders a sense of powerlessness and passivity (Brennan et al in 
press). By avoiding this, a sense of openness and alertness can be maintained. In turn 
that means that the possibility of SUIs will be discussed, risks will be borne in mind, 
procedures will be followed correctly, reviewed frequently, and improvements to 
practice implemented swiftly and thoroughly. Further sound foundations for good 
practice related to SUIs are appropriate training and regular clinical supervision. 
Advance preparation means that when, as inevitably happens sometimes, an SUI does 
occur, staff will be to a lesser degree shocked, doubtful, guilty, or anxious about the 
investigation that follows, and more confident about their practice. 
 
By adopting Root Cause Analysis, both JCAHO in the US and the NPSA in the 
UK are making a determined effort to shift the focus of post-incident investigation away 
from blaming individuals and towards the ways systems of work facilitate or hinder 
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errors. As this study collected data on events prior to the diffusion of this new method in 
the UK, it cannot provide direct evidence on whether this will be successful. However it 
does indicate that the primary sources of blame are from the staff who were involved: 
they blame themselves and each other. Secondly, the sheer fact of the post-incident 
investigation, the necessity to write reports, be interviewed, submit documentary 
evidence, all intensify the self-scrutiny that is already underway. It may take some time 
for Root Cause Analysis to impact upon these processes, if it can do so at all. 
 
Critical incident analysis used in intensive care and anaesthesia as a means of 
structuring, collating and analysing information on critical incidents. This information is 
used in quality assurance programmes to improve patient care and is embedded within 
the workplace culture. The technique of voluntary, anonymous, non-punitive critical 
incident reporting has the potential to identify incidents and latent errors before they 
become self-evident through a major incident. This systems approach focuses on 
organisational and communication problems. Standards and guidelines may help in 
weighing up the benefits and risks of invasive procedures, and interventional studies 
have shown that implementation of standards and guidelines can improve outcome 
(Frey & Argent, 2004). There are also many other forms of post-incident analysis, 
derived from both industrial and healthcare settings, which may be usefully applied in 
psychiatry (Woloshynowych et al 2005). 
 
Our interviews showed that many staff responded positively to the outcome of 
investigations, and implemented improvements to practice that increased their 
confidence. However there were indications that for a few, the feeling that they were 
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being blamed led them to reject improved policy and documentation as instruments of 
further blame in the future, or as devices to protect the organisation from future blame. 
Such feelings of passivity, vulnerability, victimisation and hostility clearly have the 
capacity to undermine good practice, and may make future SUIs more likely. 
 
The relative lack of reference to the reactions of patients contrasted with the 
emphasis on staff concerns. Staff's preoccupation with their own reactions is perhaps 
understandable when they are so strong, and when so much has to be coped with 
suddenly, all at once. The care of other patients could perhaps be better organised by 
careful planning in advance how these things should be done, and how they should be 
followed up. Staff would then have guidelines and a format to follow at a time when 
their cognitive abilities are likely to be somewhat curtailed. Bringing in outside support 
for staff might also give space for staff to deal with their emotions, so that they can 
more properly care for other patients. This issue is important, because it is clear that 
adverse incidents can trigger similar actions in other patients (Bowers et al in press a).  
 
The context of acute psychiatry in the UK makes the post-incident actions 
recommended in the literature difficult to follow. Occupancy and throughput of patients 
are both at extremely high levels, and nursing and psychiatrist vacancy rates are high 
(Garcia et al 2005, Royal College of Psychiatrists 2001). Closing the ward to allow 
reflection, cancelling patient leave, and holding staff meetings are nearly impossible to 
do in these circumstances. The most serious SUIs can also get adverse and hostile 
national media coverage. In such a system under pressure, only significant planning and 
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extra investment is likely to provide the context within which staff and patients can 
receive the proper post-incident support and care. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A strength of this study is that findings are derived from interviews of a 
substantial number of different professionals. However a limitation is that those 
interviews took place in a single organisation at one point in time, and some of the 
events referred to by subjects were quite distant. The memory of those events might 
therefore have faded, and there was no opportunity to follow the changing emotional 
and other reactions over time. In addition, interviewees may not have wished to disclose 
the entire range of feelings they had in response to incidents so, for example, reports of 
less socially acceptable feelings such as anger may have been withheld by some. 
 
The findings confirm previous studies that staff suffer considerable stress and 
trauma as a result of patient suicides and other serious untoward incidents, show that 
impact is not restricted to the ward where the patient resided, and that it can endure for 
many years. There is a need for staff to prepare themselves for these events in advance, 
and for them to receive external support once they have occurred. Both may assist staff 
to respond in ways that positively improve their practice, rather than adopt a position in 
which they see themselves as victims of punitive system that blames them for events 
outside of their control. It is as yet unclear whether Root Cause Analysis will bring 
improvements to staff's capacity to respond positively. Resource constraints and an over 
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pressured work environment handicap proper post-incident support and management. 
There is an urgent need for a deeper consideration of the responses of other patients to 
these incidents, and to plan in advance how to help them respond positively. Finally, it 
would appear that these incidents drive an ever-increasing ratchet of greater security and 
more intensive containment, with ultimately unknown effects. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The research upon which this publication is based has been supported by funding from 
the Tompkins Foundation and the Department of Health. However the views expressed 
in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the funding 
bodies. 
 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 25 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bartels, S (1987) The aftermath of suicide on the psychiatric inpatient unit. General 
Hospital Psychiatry 9 (3):189-197. 
 
Baxter, E. Hafner, R. J. and Holme, G. (1992) Assaults by patients: the experience and 
attitudes of psychiatric hospital nurses. Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry. 26 (4):567-573. 
 
Blofeld, J Sallah, D. Sashidharan, S. P Stone, R and Struthers, J. (2003) Independent 
inquiry into the death of David Bennett. Cambridge: Norfolk, Suffolk and 
Cambridgeshire Strategic Health Authority. 
 
Bowers, L. (in press) Patient homicide causes nursing staff to leave. Journal of 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 
 
Bowers, L., Alexander, J. and Gaskell, C. (2003) A Controlled Trial Of An Intervention 
To Reduce Absconding From Acute Psychiatric Wards. Journal of Psychiatric and 
Mental Health Nursing 10:410–416 
 
Bowers, L., Allan, T., Simpson, A., Nijman, H., and Warren, J. (in press a) Adverse 
incidents, patient flow and nursing workforce variables on acute psychiatric wards: The 
Tompkins Acute Ward Study. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 
 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 26 
 
Bowers, L., Jarrett, M. Clark, N., Kiyimba, F. & McFarlane, L. (1999) Absconding: 
outcome and risk. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing   6(3)213-218 
 
Bowers, L., Nijman, H., Allan, T., Simpson, A., Warren, J., and Turner, L. (2006) 
Prevention and management of aggression training and officially reported violent 
incidents: The Tompkins Acute Ward Study. Psychiatric Services 57: 1022-1026 
 
Bowers, L., Simpson, A., Alexander, J., Hackney, D., Nijman, H., Grange, A. and 
Warren, J. (2005) The Nature and Purpose of Acute Psychiatric Wards: The Tompkins 
Acute Ward Study. Journal of Mental Health 14(6)625-635 
 
Brennan, G., Flood, C. and Bowers, L. (in press) Constraints and blocks to change and 
improvement on acute psychiatric wards – lessons from the City Nurses project.  
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 
 
Brunnenberg, W. & Bijl, R. (1998) Suicide en suicidepreventie: in het psychiatrisch 
ziekenhuis [Suicide and suicide prevention in the psychiatric hospital]. Maandblad 
Geestelijke Volksgezondheid [Monthly Journal of Mental Health] 
 
Clark, N., Kiyimba, F. Bowers, L., Jarrett, M. & McFarlane, L. (1999) Absconding: 
nurses views and reactions. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing   6(3)219-
224 
 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 27 
 
Cotton, P Drake, R Whitaker, A and Potter, J (1983) Dealing with suicide on a 
psychiatric inpatient unit. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 34 (1):55-58. 
 
Department of Health (2001) Five-year report of the National Confidential Inquiry into 
Suicide and Homicide by people with mental illness. London: Department of Health. 
 
Dodds P. and Bowles N. (2001) Dismantling formal observation and refocusing nursing 
activity in acute inpatient psychiatry: a case study. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental 
Health Nursing 8:183-188. 
 
Dogget, A. M. (2004) A Statistical Comparison of Three Root Cause Analysis Tools. 
Journal of Industrial Technology 20(2)2-9 
 
Frey, B. & Argent, A. (2004) Safe paediatric intensive care. Part 2: workplace 
organisation, critical incident monitoring and guidelines. Intensive Care Medicine 
30(7)1292-7.  
 
Garcia, I Kennett, C Quraishi, M and Durcan G. (2005) Acute Care 2004. A national 
survey of adult psychiatric wards in England, London: Sainsbury Centre for Mental 
Health. 
 
Goldney, R. D. Spence, N. D. and Bowes, J. A. (1986) The safe use of high dose 
neuroleptics in a psychiatric intensive care unit. Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry 20 (3):370-375. 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 28 
 
 
Hardwick, P. (2003) Formarrhoea. Psychiatric Bulletin 27: 388-389  
 
Healthcare Commission (2005) 2005 performance ratings for mental health trusts: 
suicide rate. http://ratings2005.healthcarecommission.org.uk/home.asp 
 
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (2005) Sentinel 
Event Policy and Procedures. http://www.jcaho.org 
 
Little, J. (1992) Staff response to inpatient and outpatient suicide: What happened and 
what do we do? Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 26 (2):162-167. 
 
Main. T. F. (1957) The Ailment. British Journal of Medical Psychiatry 30: 129-145. 
 
Maltsberger J and Buie, D (1974) Countertransference hate in the treatment of suicidal 
patients. Archives of General Psychiatry 30:625-633. 
 
Morgan H. G. and Priest, P. (1991) Suicide and Other Unexpected Deaths among 
Psychiatric In-patients: The Bristol Confidential Inquiry. British Journal of Psychiatry 
158:368-374. 
 
National Patient Safety Agency (2006) National Reporting and Learning System. 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk 
 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 29 
 
Nijman HLI, Palmstierna T, Almvik R, Stolker JJ. (2004) Fifteen years of research with 
the Staff Observation Aggression Scale: a review. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 2004: 
1–10. 
 
Paterson, B. Stark C. (2001) Social policy and mental illness in England in the 1990s: 
violence, moral panic and critical discourse. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health 
Nursing 8(3) 257-267  
 
Powell, J. Geddes, J. Deeks, J. and Goldacre, H. K. (2000) Suicide in Psychiatric 
Hospital In-patients: Risk factors and their predictive power. British Journal of 
Psychiatry 176:266-272. 
 
Rooney, J. L. and Vanden Heuvel, L. N. (2004) Root Cause Analysis For Beginners. 
Quality Progress, July, pp45-53 
 
Royal College of Psychiatrists (2001). Roles and Responsibilities of a Consultant in 
General Psychiatry: Council report. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
 
Ryan J and Poster E (1989) The assaulted nurse: Short-term and long-term responses. 
Archives of Psychiatric Nursing 3 (6):323-331. 
 
Simpson, A., Bowers, L., Alexander, J., Ridley, C. and Warren, J. (2005) Occupational 
Therapy and Multidisciplinary Working on Acute Psychiatric Wards: The Tompkins 
Acute Ward Study. British Journal of Occupational Therapy 68(12)545-552 
Serious untoward incidents 
Page - 30 
 
 
Turns D and Gruenberg, E (1973) An attendant is murdered: The state hospital 
responds. Psychiatric Quarterly 47 (4):487-494. 
 
Vogel R and Wolfersdorf, M (1987) Staff response to the suicide of psychiatric 
inpatients. The Journal of Crisis Intervention and Suicide Prevention 8 (2):178-184. 
 
Woloshynowych M, Rogers S, Taylor-Adams S, Vincent C. (2005) The investigation 
and analysis of critical incidents and adverse events in healthcare. Health Technology 
Assessment 9(19). 
